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Abstract 
What methodological approaches do research programs use to investigate the world? Elizabeth 
Lloyd’s Logic of Research Questions characterizes such approaches in terms of the questions 
that the researchers ask and causal factors they consider. She uses the Logic of Research 
Questions Framework to criticize adaptationist programs in evolutionary biology for 
dogmatically assuming selection explanations of the traits of organisms. I argue that Lloyd’s 
general criticism of methodological adaptationism is an artefact of the impoverished LRQ. My 
Ordered Factors Proposal extends the LRQ to characterize approaches with sequences of 
questions and factors. I highlight the importance that ordering one’s investigation plays in 
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approaches at the level of adaptationism by analyzing two research programs in community 
ecology: competitionists and neutralists. Competitionists and neutralists take opposed starting 
points and use explanatory and developmental heuristics to consider more factors in due time. 
On the Ordered Factors Proposal, these approaches are not only the ecological factors they are 
open to considering but also the order in which they will consider them. My disagreement with 
Lloyd’s over how to characterize methodological approaches reflects different views about 





1. Introduction  
Scientists decide on what methodology to use to approach their problems. High-level 
methodologies such as adaptationism in evolution have been denounced by some for hindering 
progress as they are commended by others for accelerating it. As methodologies serve to 
organize and drive scientific research projects and programs, the epistemology of science 
deserves a framework to characterize and critique them. Such a framework can then itself aid in 
better understanding why and how methodologies inhibit and enable investigation.  
Elizabeth Lloyd developed the Logic of Research Questions framework as a tool to 
characterize and critique the methodological approaches that research programs use across 
biology and climate science in terms of questions and answers (Lloyd 2015, 2016, Lloyd and 
Oreskes 2018). She has deployed the Logic of Research Questions (LRQ) to show that several 
adaptationist research programs in behavioral evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology 
research are problematic because of the very questions asked and the answers sought. But Lloyd 
also uses the LRQ to characterize and critique methodological approaches more generally. 
According to Lloyd, all programs in evolutionary biology that use the methodological 
adaptationist approach assume out the outset that the traits under investigation have a function. 
Therefore, all adaptationist programs should be rejected for not being open to considering all the 
other known evolutionary causes. Lloyd advocates the Evolutionary Factors Framework 
approach which makes no such assumption.  
Lloyd aims for the LRQ to be useful for scholars of science when analyzing research 
programs and investigative methodologies beyond adaptationism. But to be a useful tool, the 
LRQ needs to be straightforward to apply to new cases. In this paper I argue for extending the 
LRQ with the Ordered Factors Proposal by challenging Lloyd’s general argument against 
4 
 
methodological adaptationism. The LRQ assumes that methodological approaches are 
characterized by single questions. This entails that there is no way to distinguish objectionable 
from acceptable forms of adaptationism while also distinguishing among other acceptable 
approaches. To show this I draw on a case study of two approaches used in community ecology 
which lack the historical associations of adaptationism. Competitionists and neutralists order 
their investigation using starting points just like acceptable adaptationists. The Ordered Factors 
Proposal then characterizes approaches using ordered sequences of factors. In addition to 
making room with the LRQ for acceptable methodological adaptationism, my proposal avoids 
the consequence that there is only one acceptable approach to studying evolution.  
 
2. The Logic of Research Questions  
The LRQ is a tool for characterizing the methodological approaches biologists undertake 
in terms of questions and answers. The scientific domain for the LRQ is potentially all of 
science, but Lloyd focuses primarily on biology and especially the form and distribution of 
organismal traits, the plurality of evolutionary factors affecting these traits, and the research 
programs investigating the factors affecting the traits.  
Lloyd presents the LRQ by contrasting two approaches: the Evolutionary Factors 
Framework and methodological adaptationism. Some research programs should be characterized 
as methodological adaptationist (MA) by the LRQ, asking the dogmatic question, What is the 
function of this trait? Permissible answers to this question are all of the form, The function of the 
trait is X. Therefore, biologists using MA assume natural selection to be responsible and fail to 
consider the responsibility of other evolutionary factors.  
Lloyd proposes an alternative methodology meant to rectify adaptationism’s selective 
5 
 
blindness. The Evolutionary Factors Framework (EFF) asks the ecumenical question, What 
evolutionary factors account for the form and distribution of this trait? According to the logic of 
questions, permissible answers to this question are of the form, The evolutionary factors that 
account for the form and distribution of this trait are X, Y, Z, etc., where X, Y, Z are different 
evolutionary factors including: natural selection, sexual selection, genetic linkage, phyletic 
history, developmental factors, drift, embryological constraints, social, environmental, and niche 
coevolutionary factors, etc. (Lloyd 2015, 343). That is, biologists using the EFF are open to 
considering all known evolutionary factors as potentially responsible.  
After distinguishing their questions, Lloyd presents a powerful and simple argument 
against research programs ever using MA and for always using the EFF.  
Evolutionary Factors Argument 
1. All evolutionary research programs using the MA approach are open to 
considering only a subset of known evolutionary factors.  
2. No evolutionary research program should be open to considering only a subset of 
known evolutionary factors.  
3. Therefore, no evolutionary research program should use methodological 
adaptationism.  
4. Instead, all research programs studying evolution should be open to considering 
all known factors and use the EFF approach.  
I deny that premise 1 applies to all approaches which should be considered methodological 
adaptationist and I resist inferring conclusion 4 from premises 1 and 2. I agree with Lloyd’s 
critiques of the particular research programs guilty of pursuing natural selection as the only 
potential cause in evolutionary biology. But Lloyd does more than critique particular 
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adaptationist programs, she argues that methodological adaptationism qua methodological 
approach should be abandoned. This general claim follows if all methodological adaptationists 
dogmatically assume all traits have functions despite all evidence to the contrary. But I am not 
convinced that methodological adaptationism is itself the root of the problems and so I am not 
convinced that the LRQ appropriately characterizes all methodological adaptationist programs as 
MA. I aim to make space within the logic of research questions for some methodological 
adaptationists not using MA and for a plurality of good approaches to capture the actual 
methodological diversity in biology.    
To pursue my critique of LRQ, I raise the issue of how to classify programs who 
temporarily or at first pursue natural selection as the cause of investigated traits. I begin by 
posing a dilemma to the LRQ as it stands now. I then analyze Lloyd’s texts to show that one can 
find support in Lloyd’s texts for both horns of the dilemma, making the results of using the LRQ 
to classify the selection-first approaches indeterminate.  
 
3. Who is a Methodological Adaptationist? 
Lloyd developed the LRQ to address the problematic programs across biology which 
only seek to evidence adaptative hypotheses. Ernst Mayr defended methodological adaptationism 
in response to Gould and Lewontin’s famous critique (Gould and Lewontin 1979, Mayr 1983). 
For Lloyd, Mayr’s research approach is MA because he advocates always starting the 
investigation of the cause of some trait in a population with the hypothesis that it was caused by 
selection. Mayr says that it is only after selection cannot be shown that chance hypotheses 
(which seem to stand in for all other hypotheses) have tentative warrant and should be pursued.  
The common thread in defenses of methodological adaptationism that Lloyd traces all 
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follow Mayr in advocating looking for selection first and then looking for other hypotheses. 
Lloyd finds that many biologists who claim to be open to alternative hypotheses after selection 
hypotheses are not in practice open to considering alternatives. And this, she thinks, is the 
general feature of methodological adaptationism, which is why she uses the LRQ to classify 
them as MA1, asking “What is the function of this trait?” This question is inherently problematic 
because it fails to consider almost all evolutionary causes in acceptable answers.  
 The issue I want to address is whether Lloyd is correct in general to classify the 
approaches of research programs which begin with searching for adaptationism as MA in the 
LRQ. I agree with Lloyd that, given the LRQ, MA is always bad. But I am not convinced that all 
methodological adaptationists should be classified as MA. 
The advocate for the LRQ faces a dilemma that Lloyd is implicitly aware of insofar as 
she gives reasons to come down on both sides. The two opposed theses are:  
Dilemma 1 
(1) All methodological adaptationists use MA.  
(2) Some methodological adaptationists use EFF. 
 
In Favor of (1) All Methodological Adaptationists use MA. 
“And philosophers and biologists have argued that there is a certain approach to 
adaptationism, under which one just assumes temporarily that the trait is an adaptation, 
and proceeds from there, known as methodological adaptationism, that is both productive 
and harmless. I think this is false. Adaptationism is not harmless, even in its weakened 
 
1 MA and EFF will refer to their classification within the LRQ (by Lloyd usually). I make it clear 
when I am using “methodological adaptationist” in a non-LRQ way.  
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methodological form.” (Lloyd 2016, 130)  
Lloyd clearly states the thesis that she objects to: adaptationism which looks for selection first is 
itself objectionable. The contrast is with an openly dogmatic adaptationism which outright 
claims to never look beyond selection hypotheses. But for Lloyd, the selection-first 
adaptationism is itself problematic and objectionable.  
“... it is still an open question whether the method outlined for the methodological 
adaptationist in practice ever allows non-adaptive explanations ever to win the day.” 
(Lloyd 2015, 346) 
The reason why she finds the selection-first adaptationists objectionable is that she doubts that 
they ever actually consider other evolutionary factors. In both this and the previous quotation, 
she is writing generally about methodological adaptationism and its characterization by the LRQ, 
not making claims about particular research programs.  
“Since Mayr and other methodological adaptationists admit the possibility of nonadaptive 
alternatives, it would seem that they admit, at least in lip service, that there should be 
nonadaptive answers on the list of possible answers to their question. Should nonadaptive 
answers belong on the methodological adaptationist list? Should the methodological 
adaptationist list perhaps look like the evolutionary factors list, but with a few more 
entries like: ‘‘The function of this trait is P’’? The answer to both of these questions is 
‘‘no.’’” (Lloyd 2015, 346) 
Lloyd here considers the possibility that some methodological adaptationists should be classified 
as using EFF in LRQ. And she rejects the possibility for reasons that she argues for later in the 
paper. I will address her strongest reasons below in section 7. In short, she thinks that 




“Secondly, if, in attempting to pursue the evolutionary factors methodology, the research 
community gets stuck on the first, adaptationist step of pursuing only functional 
answers to the question of whether the trait has a function, then the other 
characterizations of the trait will not be pursued, and a balanced view of the weight of 
evidence will not appear. Logically, they would be behaving as methodological 
adaptationists.” (Lloyd 2016, 150) 
Here Lloyd makes the point that what matters is not what questions the researchers say that they 
ask but only the question they actually ask and so the answers they actually allow. She imagines 
someone talking as using the EFF but in practice using MA. This shows the deep interpretative 
issues facing scholars of science concerning how to associate an actual research approach with a 
research question on the LRQ.  
 
In Favor of (2) Some methodological adaptationists do not use MA. 
“When we investigate the evolutionary origins of a given trait, as adaptationists we might 
often prioritize the functional factors, natural and sexual selection, as the factors of most 
interest in evolutionary research, and we might start with the question, “Does this trait 
have a function?” If the trait, after investigation, doesn't appear to have a function, 
correlation with fitness, or design features, we might pursue other evolutionary 
explanations ...” (Lloyd 2016, 132) 
This comes in the context of explaining the EFF approach. Here she says that the EFF can 
prioritize adaptation and so certain factors over others. It is not clear how prioritizing is different 
from starting with adaptationism and how these selection-first EFF users avoid the pitfalls of 
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methodological adaptationism. In terms of identification as EFF, it is clear when a program starts 
with selection and actually ends up supporting another kind of hypothesis. But not all cases are 
so clear and there will be cases which are not obviously EFF or MA. 
“Someone following the evolutionary factors framework, asks, quite generally: “What 
evolutionary factors account for the form and distribution of this trait,” or, for example, 
they can start with “Does this trait have a function?” 
This question has a series of possible distinct answers (that might be considered in any 
order, except that the adaptive answers usually go first in practice):” (Lloyd 2016, 132) 
Here she claims that the EFF allows considering factors in different orders and systematically 
prioritizing adaptation, which is just how defenders of methodological adaptationism 
characterize their approach. 
“We can easily use a more encompassing evolutionary and Darwinian method, the 
evolutionary factors approach, under which we can ask a variety of questions, including 
the adaptationist question” (Lloyd 2016, 137) 
Here she claims that the EFF allows the possibility of asking the adaptationist question. This is 
the first time she explicitly talks in terms of multiple questions.  
“So, it is not just that the methodological adaptationists are asking the wrong questions, 
but in addition, that they are mishandling a possible answer to the question that they are 
asking, the one that says, “this trait does not have a function.” At that point, the 
methodological adaptationist could move on to a different, more productive question, 
such as “What other evolutionary factors may play a role in evolving this trait?” But, and 




Lloyd again talks in terms of multiple questions and question switching. This is hard to interpret. 
Of course, MA in the problematic sense means never considering other factors. But what if the 
program she is imaging did exist, how would we characterize it? There are two possibilities. 
First, the program which first asked the MA question and the EFF question switched approaches 
from MA to EFF. Second, the program consistently follows the MA (or EFF) approach, which 
allows multiple questions and starting with certain factors.  
 
Taking Stock 
 Both (1) and (2) have textual support and opposition. Lloyd’s official position is (1), that 
the methodological adaptationists which she has analyzed and critiqued use MA and that this is 
why their approach should be abandoned in general. In order to challenge horn (1), in the next 
section I provide a novel case study of successful approaches analogous to adaptationism which 
in practice move beyond their starting point. My case study further challenges horn (2) by 
showing that opposing approaches would be both classified as EFF. The LRQ has the 
consequence that all non-objectionable approaches are EFF. I therefore use my case study to 
reject the dilemma and suggest a way of enriching the LRQ with more structure to enable finer 
grade distinctions in approaches.  
 
4. Two Approaches in Community Ecology 
 The LRQ is applicable across the biological sciences and beyond. As Lloyd says,  
“While I apply this logic to the adaptationist methodology, my fundamental claim is not 
about adaptationism exclusively, but rather about how scientific investigation is done, in 
general, and the ‘‘logic of research questions’’ is thus applicable to any scientific field 
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that experiences controversy about methods and inference.” (Lloyd 2015, 346) 
Community ecology is a natural place to look to evaluate ideas about research programs and 
methodological approaches because it has so many of them. The diversity and complexity of the 
systems studied, its disjoint history, and the lack of any general theoretical framework all 
contribute to methodological diversity in ecology. I examine two approaches analogous to 
adaptationism: competitionism and neutralism. Extending Lloyd’s framework to ecology is 
straightforward: the Ecological Factors Framework asks, What ecological factors account for the 
form and distribution of organisms in this community?  
 
Community Ecology: Patterns, Processes, and Heuristics 
Community ecologists are interested in describing, predicting, explaining, and controlling 
patterns of abundance and diversity of organisms that live in the same place. How much 
biodiversity is there, and what ecological factors maintain and modify it? Ecological 
communities occupy the range in between single populations and whole ecosystems. Community 
ecologists often restrict their domain to single trophic level communities, in order to exclude 
interactions involving predation and to ensure all species compete for the same kinds of 
resources (Mittelbach and McGill 2019).  
 Many of the basic patterns community ecologists study come from counting and 
sampling (Magurran 2004). Species richness counts record the number of species in a 
community. Relative species abundance distributions record the number of species and the 
number of individuals in a community. Ecologists study these patterns both individually (for a 
single community at a single time) and comparatively (across time, space, and scales—from 
square meter plots to entire continents). Many features of these patterns call for explanation: the 
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number of species increases with habitable area, most species are rare, relative species 
abundance distributions have a characteristic shape, species correlate with certain resources, not 
every species lives everywhere it can, etc. Other significant patterns include resource-species 
correlations, from why certain species colonize open spaces to why conifers live in the taiga.  
Ecologists have discovered many causal factors relevant to these patterns at many scales. 
Mark Vellend proposed a theory of ecological communities which unifies the many factors and 
processes investigated by community ecologists into four high-level processes (Vellend 2010, 
2016): drift, dispersal, speciation, and selection. These processes are different ways of changing 
the composition and abundances of species. Drift is stochastic death and birth; dispersal is how 
organisms move across space; speciation is how populations of new species arise; and selection 
is the differential reproduction of certain individuals due to their species. Ecological selection is 
more commonly known as interspecific competition because it arises from competition between 
differentially adapted individuals of different species. I will refer to it as just competition.  
Different research programs focus on different subsets of Vellend’s four processes. 
Programs interested in descriptive and predictive accuracy can formalize their chosen processes 
into mathematical models. They can then compare the models with abundance data and evaluate 
the model fit with statistics.2 Whether a model fit is good or poor depends on the predictions of 
the model, the data, and the standards set. 
We need to look at three heuristics scientists use to respond to model fits. I describe the 
heuristics abstractly here and in the next section show how they are used. A few background 
details about the heuristics first. These are heuristics in the sense of Wimsatt, problem solving 
strategies with limited scope but great power when used in conditions they are adapted to 
 
2 I trace the straightforward “model fit” to (Lloyd 2009).  
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(Wimsatt 2007). These 3 heuristics address a relative significance problem (Beatty 1997, Kovaka 
2017, Ch 5). Relative significance problems concern the relative significance of multiple causal 
factors or processes to a pattern. The causal relevance of the causal factors or processes to the 
kind of pattern is accepted. A relative significance problem asks what the contribution of each of 
the factors is in particular cases. While any relative ratio of significances may be found, the 
simple way of describing these heuristics use the idea that some subset of processes “dominates” 
or accounts for more of the data than the remaining processes. Each of the following 3 heuristics 
are ways that ecologists have for making inferences about the relative significance.  
Heuristic 1: Basic Explanation 
From good model fit, conclude that the processes included in the model dominate the data.  
This is the basic modeling inference, adapted to the case of relative significance of 
processes and models containing subsets of processes.  
Heuristic 2: Baseline Modeling3 
From poor model fit, conclude that the processes excluded from the model dominate the data.  
The model playing the role of the baseline model is used to detect deviations from the 
data. These deviations are then ascribed to known or unknown processes excluded from 
the model. The lack of deviations from the baseline model are ascribed to the processes 
included in the model.4  
Heuristic 3: Adding Complexity 
From poor model fit, decide to augment the model with (some of) the excluded processes.  
The shortcomings of the model are here rectified, not by citing additional processes, but 
 
3 Baseline modeling is characterized in detail in (Bausman 2018). 
4 I might have said that Baseline Modeling includes Basic Explanation when the model fit is 
good, but it is useful to keep them distinct as the former is less appreciated. 
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my augmenting the model to include the excluded processes. Adding Complexity 
describes how models are developed over time, not used for explanations. The augmented 
models can then be compared with data and followed by any of these heuristics again.  
Used in concert, these three heuristics enable research programs to respond productively to any 
confrontation of models to data and to develop over time.  
 
Competitionism 
Competitionism is the approach based on starting to investigate the role of interspecific 
competition in patterns of abundance and diversity. Competitionists then use Basic Explanation, 
Baseline Modeling, and Adding Complexity heuristics to move beyond interspecific competition.  
Competitionist research programs tell the following basic story: Different species have 
different abilities to utilize resources. The species best able to utilize a resource will exclude its 
competitors from using the resource. In this way, species differences and resource distributions 
affect species abundances. Competitionism’s basic explanatory principle is the competitive 
exclusion principle: sufficiently similar species cannot coexist because one will out-compete and 
exclude the other. Their basic investigative heuristic is to seek relevant species differences when 
coexistence is observed. In this way, the competitionist’s starting point is interspecific 
competition based on species differences.  
One competitionist research program is led by David Tilman and built around his 
Resource-Ratio, known as R* (“R Star”) Theory (Tilman 1980, 1982). The only factor 
considered in R* Theory is competition between species for limited resources. In R* Theory, 
each species has a minimum level of a resource (the R* value) that they require to at least 
maintain their population size. The Theory predicts that, when two species compete for a single 
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limiting resource, the species with the lower R* value will exclude the other species. Species 
coexistence is possible, for example, when two species compete for two limiting resources and 
neither species has lower R*s for both resources (see (Miller et al. 2005, Wilson, Spijkerman, 
and Huisman 2007) for a general review of R* Theory). 
An example of a basic explanatory success for this competitionist program is an 
experiment Tilman performed for his PhD (Tilman 1977). Tilman gathered two species of algae 
from Lake Michigan and measured their respective R* values for both phosphate and silicate 
inside of a chemostat (a laboratory environment in which the resource level can be kept constant 
over time). With these 4 R* values, Tilman made predictions from R* Theory about whether the 
two algae species would coexist or not in the chemostat given certain levels of phosphate and 
silicate. Tilman was able to produce both stable coexistence and competitive exclusion in the 
chemostat by varying the relative ratios of phosphate and silicate, confirming R* Theory. Using 
the Basic Explanation heuristic, Tilman argues that this the successful predictions of R* Theory 
show that interspecific competition is responsible for both producing coexistence and 
competitive exclusion (see also e.g. (Tilman 1986, Stanley Harpole and Tilman 2006)) 
Yet competitionists are not blind to everything but interspecific competition. Tilman has 
argued that some cases where his R* Theory fails to give accurate predictions show that 
additional processes such as immigration are important. For example, Tilman leads the 
University of Minnesota’s Cedar Creek Ecosystem Science Reserve, part of the Long-Term 
Ecological Research network, where he conducts grassland field experiments. Field experiments 
must control for invasion by wild species. Tilman argues that some cases where R* Theory 
poorly predicts abundance patterns actually show the effect of immigration on the experimental 
plots (Tilman 1994).  
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This is an example of the explanatory heuristic Baseline Modeling. The competitionists 
begin with a theory that includes only interspecific competition and test it. When the model fit is 
poor, rather than being disconfirmation of R* Theory, the competitionists conclude that other 
processes such as immigration not included in the model generating the predictions are playing 
an important role in structuring the observed patterns.  
Tilman has developed R* Theory in a new direction due in part to the Invasion Paradox: 
Native species resist invasion from exotic species. But exotic species also invade and exclude 
native species. R* Theory explains the former well, but the latter shows the importance of 
immigration. Tilman’s Stochastic Niche Theory incorporates drift and immigration with resource 
competition (Tilman 2004). This is an example of the developmental heuristic Adding 
Complexity. Starting from only interspecific competition, the competitionists are led to include 
other processes such as drift in their theoretical toolbox.  
 
Neutralism 
Neutralism is the approach based on starting to investigate the role of drift, immigration, 
and speciation on patterns of abundance and diversity. Neutralists then use Basic Explanation, 
Baseline Modeling, and Adding Complexity heuristics to move beyond drift, immigration, and 
speciation.   
Neutralist research programs tell the following basic story: Drift decreases the diversity 
of a community by slowly driving species extinct. Immigration increases diversity as individuals 
from the metacommunity, typically with greater diversity, slowly disperse into the local 
community. In the metacommunity, diversity is maintained against drift via speciation. 
Moreover, all individuals, regardless of species, are functionally equivalent or neutral. This has 
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the effect of both excluding interspecific competition and making current abundances dependent 
on past abundances. Abundance patterns result from the relationship of the rates of the three 
processes of drift, immigration, and speciation in much the same way as the water level of a sink 
results from the relationship of the inflow and outflow rates. Neutralism’s basic explanatory 
principle is that even functionally equivalent species can coexist indefinitely. Their basic 
investigative heuristic is to seek the effects of community size, immigration, and speciation when 
coexistence is observed. In this way, the neutralist’s starting point is drift, immigration, and 
speciation based on species similarities.5  
The best example of a neutralist research program is led by Stephen Hubbell, who 
developed The Unified Neutral Theory of Biodiversity and Biogeography (Neutral Theory for 
short) (Hubbell 2001).6 Neutral Theory includes only drift, immigration, and speciation. Neutral 
models are individual-based models which assume neutrality and approximately fixed 
community sizes. Neutral Theory predicts that species abundance distributions will fit the 
statistical distributions produced by the neutral model. An example of a basic explanatory 
success for the neutralist program is its ability to describe the abundance patterns of a tropical 
forest. Hubbell co-founded the Forest Dynamics Plot Project at the Smithsonian Tropical 
 
5 Neutrality is logically independent from drift, immigration, and speciation, but they are 
historically linked. Neutrality alone is not the neutralists’s starting point, first, because it is not a 
process, and second, because neutralists are far more inclined to relax neutrality before they 
remove drift, immigration, or speciation from their theory or models. Granting their strong 
Lakatosianism (which both Lloyd’s and this paper implicitly challenge), the Ale and colleagues 
(Ale et al. 2019) crucially misidentify the “hard core” of the neutrality program as neutrality and 
their argument for neutralism being a degenerate program fails because of it. See (Bausman 
2019) for the extended version of this argument.  
6 The history of neutral theorizing and modeling in ecology is complicated and somewhat 
controversial. In brief, (Caswell 1976) imported neutral models from evolution. Then Hubbell 
adapted and applied them to tropical forests (Hubbell 1979, Hubbell and Foster 1986). Later, 
Hubbell published two more papers before his 2001 book, while at the same time Bell wrote two 
papers (Bell 2000, 2001). For more on the history, see (Bausman 2016, Chs. 1, 2).  
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Research Institute on Barro Colorado Island in 1982. They have complete census data for the 50-
hectare plot for every 5 years. The neutral model describes the abundances and dynamics of the 
BCI forest plot well. Using the Basic Explanation heuristic, Hubbell and colleagues argue that 
the neutral model’s good model fits to that the patterns of abundance of trees on BCI show that 
these patterns are mainly the result of immigration balancing drift (Condit, Chisholm, and 
Hubbell 2012).  
Neutralists are not blind to the effects of species differences and interspecific competition 
either. For example, Hubbell showed that while the species abundances in five forest plots from 
Central America can be explained using neutral models, there is a stronger correlation of the 
abundances of the commonest species across the five plots than is expected given a neutral 
model (Hubbell 2001, 337). Because the neutral model leaves out interspecific competition and 
poorly predicts the abundances of the commonest species, Hubbell argues that their abundances 
are dominated by interspecific competition. This is an example of the explanatory heuristic 
Baseline Modeling.7  
Other neutralists have directly modified neutral models to relax neutrality and introduce 
interspecific competition. For example, Rosindell, Harmon, and Etienne use to the neutral model 
to predict the change in number of species over macro-evolutionary time (Rosindell, Harmon, 
and Etienne 2015). However, the neutral model predicts too many species at any given time than 
 
7 The neutral model has been claimed to supply the appropriate "null hypothesis" with respect to 
competition hypotheses. This is exact opposite illegitimate strategy to the one Lloyd 
characterizes (Lloyd 2015, 353). In Lloyd's case, causal theories are called a null hypothesis in 
order to disqualify them from providing causal explanations. In the neutral theory's case, a causal 
theory is called a null hypothesis in order to give it the benefit of the doubt with respect to causal 
explanations. I agree with Lloyd that neither case is doing statistical null hypothesis testing and 
both lines of argument are unjustified. See (Bausman and Halina 2018) for the opposite case to 




we observe in the fossil record. The ecologists therefore relaxed the neutrality assumption and 
introduced small selective differences into the neutral model. The small degree of interspecific 
competition included in the nearly neutral model reduces the expected number of species and 
gives more accurate predictions. This is an example of the developmental heuristic Adding 
Complexity. 
 
5. Approaches Order Factors  
Why Community Ecology is a Problem for the LRQ  
The case of competitionism and neutralism is an example of relevantly different 
methodological approaches which are both open to considering, and have actually considered, all 
relevant factors. A philosophical account of methodological approaches should be able to 
account for this, but the LRQ cannot do so as it currently stands. To see this, let us ask how the 
LRQ should characterize competitionism and neutralism in comparison with the MA and 
(ecological) EFF. This leads to a second dilemma:  
Dilemma 2 
(3) Competitionism and neutralism are analogs of MA.  
(4) Competitionism and neutralism are each versions of the EFF.  
On horn (3), competitionism and neutralism are analogs of MA because they each 
investigate a subset of ecological factors and do not treat all factors equally. These approaches 
are distinct from EFF and from each other. One consequence of taking horn (3) is that 
competitionism and neutralism rise and fall with methodological adaptationism. Horn (3) goes 
together naturally with horn (1) above. All three approaches should be shunned in favor of EFFs. 
On horn (4), competitionism and neutralism are versions of the EFF because they exclude no 
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factors from their investigation. One consequence of taking horn (4) is that both research 
programs use the same approach. In fact, all acceptable approaches are the same approach.  
 Horn (3) is unacceptable, first, because neither competitionists nor neutralists exclude 
any subset of factors from their full investigation. competitionists sometimes invoke drift, 
immigration, and speciation; neutralists sometimes invoke interspecific competition. Further, (3) 
is unacceptable because the competitionists and neutralists run successful research programs that 
persist against calls for unity within ecology. This suggests they are useful and shifts the burden 
of proof to find a problem particular to each of them individually. Until such a problem is 
identified, the approaches that successful programs use should be seen as acceptable. 
Horn (4) is unacceptable because it lumps together distinct approaches. Competitionism 
and neutralism go about their investigation in mutually opposed directions and they should not 
both be characterized as EFF. Further, a satisfactory account of research questions and 
approaches should distinguish between approaches which take a starting point and approaches 
which have no systematic order to their research.  
If forced to choose, I suspect the proponent of the LRQ view would choose horn (4) and 
bite the bullet that competitionists and neutralists use the same approach qua LRQ, perhaps 
viewing them as two versions of the same approach. This puts tension on choosing horn (1) of 
Dilemma 1 and I expect they would now choose horn (2) should analogous instances of 
methodological adaptationist programs in evolutionary biology be produced. But both horns (2) 
and (4) seem best only given that they are better than their alternatives. The common assumption 
of both dilemmas is that methodologies must be characterized solely in terms of single questions 




The Ordered Factors Proposal 
Drawing on the importance of starting points, the LRQ needs to consider the way that 
approaches order their investigation of questions and factors. The Ordered Factors (+OF) 
proposal extends the LRQ to represent approaches using sequences of research questions or 
factors, the ordered sequences corresponding to the order of inquiry. The evolutionary and 
ecological factors frameworks characterizations remain unchanged. Now we can distinguish 
dogmatic methodological adaptationism from sophisticated methodological adaptationism. 
Dogmatic adaptationism uses MA. Sophisticated adaptationism can be formulated as: 
Sophisticated Adaptationism 
1. How can natural selection account for the form and distribution of this trait? 
2. How can other evolutionary causes account for what natural selection cannot? 
Accordingly, the approaches in community ecology can be formulated as:  
Competitionism 
1. How can interspecific competition account for the distribution and abundance of 
organisms? 
2. How can drift, immigration, and speciation account for what interspecific competition 
cannot? 
Neutralism 
1. How can drift, immigration, and speciation account for the distribution and abundance 
of organisms? 
2. How can interspecific competition account for what interspecific competition cannot? 
Because with the LRQ, research questions imply their answers and their answers are just sets of 
causes or factors which are acceptable answers to the question, to shorten their description we 
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can also represent approaches as sets of causes or factors, as in Table 1. This allows comparison 
of the various options of the views at a glance. Let round brackets mark ordered sequences and 
curly brackets mark unordered sets.  
Table 1 
 Competitionism Neutralism 
Horn 3 4 3 4 
LRQ  {C} {D, I, S, C} {D, I, S} {D, I, S, C} 
+OF (C, {D, I, S}) ({D, I, S}, C) 
 
In characterizing a methodology with +OF, we need not find a linear ordering of all the factors 
considered. Neither adaptationism, nor competitionism, nor neutralism linearly orders all the 
factors it considers. Some methodologies may have no general ordering of their factors. They 
may have heuristics for when to apply one ordering and when to apply another. The +OF 
proposal does not impose order on the programs, it captures the ordering present in the 
methodology.8  
 
Why Starting Points 
Methodologies order factors because orderings are useful for biologists addressing 
relative significance problems. Competitionists and neutralists do argue sometimes as if they are 
engaged in a theory choice problem between whether interspecific competition or drift, 
immigration, and speciation is the one true set of processes responsible for abundance patterns. 
 
8 These two features do not exhaust methodologies. One need only find two programs which 
have distinct approaches, but which share the same factors considered and ordering to see this.  
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But biologists’ debates are not usually like the exclusive choices found in the Geocentrists vs. 
Heleocentrists. While biologists often argue in terms of why their pet processes are the most 
important processes, their actions show that they acknowledge that all the known factors are in 
play. Starting points help biologists to answer these relative significance problems.  
By imposing an ordering on their inquiry, when biologists decide that they can no longer 
make do, they move beyond their starting point. As I showed with the competitionist and 
neutralist programs, biologists have at least two heuristics for this. In Baseline Modeling the 
processes excluded from the models and incorporated directly into the explanation of the pattern. 
The reason neutral models offer bad predictions of, say, which species of paramecium will 
exclude the other when they are isolated and given a constant level of nutrient is because 
interspecific competition is responsible for this exclusion. By finding that you cannot do without 
citing interspecific competition, you have better evidence that interspecific competition is 
playing an important role than if you merely made good predictions from a competition model. 
And similarly for Adding Complexity.  
Bill Wimsatt argues that the initial assumptions research programs make do not directly 
aim at the truth but are strategic decisions about how to get closer to the truth later (Wimsatt 
1987). This fits how many biologists describe their methodologies. As Tilman writes:  
Thus, many of the broad, long-term patterns observed in plant communities may be the result of 
interspecific competition for limiting resources. Such correspondence does not mean that other processes 
are unimportant in structuring these plant communities, but the simple theory that predicts them may 
provide a framework for more detailed studies. (Tilman 1986, 75) 
Hubbell similarly writes that, 
 … the most rapid path to understanding ecological systems… is through an interaction of empirical 
science… with theories that start very simply, with few free parameters and assumptions, and add 
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complexity reluctantly, kicking and screaming, only when absolutely necessary to obtain some desired 
level of fit to the data. Neutral theory is one such starting point. (Hubbell 2008, 143) 
Lloyd cites Ernst Mayr writing,  
"[The evolutionary biologist] must first attempt to explain biological phenomena and processes as the 
product of natural selection. Only after all attempts to do so have failed, is he justified in designating the 
unexplained residue tentatively as a product of chance." (Mayr 1983) 
She is right to press Mayr for waiting too long to look for alternative explanations, but in doing 
so she throws out the characteristic feature of adaptationism: taking natural selection as its 
starting point.  
Given that starting points are useful, it is a further interesting question why there is an 
extant plurality of them across biological disciplines. Fully answering this question goes beyond 
the scope of this paper. But here is a clue. In the examples from ecology, the most important 
factor shaping each methodology is the initial target system of the program.9 competition theory 
was built around creating artificial situations in a laboratory where a small number of species 
interact for controlled resources.10 Neutral theory was built around counting trees in tropical 
forests where ecologists have no control. Arguably, each program grew from systems in which 
their starting point processes dominate the other known processes. Over their development, these 
programs were driven beyond their starting points by the failure of nature to abide with what 
worked earlier.  
 
6. Objections and Responses 
 
9 Other significant factors shaping methodology include: the question asked, the traditions one 
works in, observational and experimental techniques and instruments, disciplinary constraints, 
personalities, etc. 




Lack of Stopping Rules 
In characterizing the LRQ, Lloyd anticipates the proposal I defend. Her strongest point 
against the +OF proposal is her denial of the existence of stopping rules. She argues 
adaptationists like Mayr, who say they only start with natural selection before moving to 
additional factors, cannot actually move on because they lack rules for when to stop looking for a 
given factor. This is not the statistician’s concept of a rule for when to stop collecting data and 
begin analyzing it. The concern is that, without formal standards for when to abandon the search 
for the function of a trait, adaptationists will under no circumstances consider alternative 
explanations. This would entail that starting points are not useful because they would not enable 
heuristics such as Baseline Modeling and Adding Complexity.  
My response to this is twofold. First, this is not a special problem for adaptationists. Any 
methodology which entertains working hypotheses they are willing to revise faces the problem 
of whether to tinker with or abandon a given hypothesis that has not met the standards of 
evidence. The evolutionary factors framework also lacks a stopping rule for make decisions such 
as: Did this developmental constraint hypothesis perform worse than a sexual selection 
hypothesis because development was truly the better explanation or because they had not stated 
the developmental constraint hypothesis good enough? 
Second, I deny that formal, algorithmic stopping rules are required. Scientists have only 
heuristics for when to move on. Good judgment should decide when enough failure is enough, 
and the development of a research program involves risk and trial and error. I agree with Lakatos 
that judgements about the health of a research program are only justified in hindsight after a long 
run.  
Adaptationism is not Useful 
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Lloyd almost explicitly addresses the use of starting points in one place,  
I do not mean to deny the common point about the division of scientific labor, by saying 
that it is a good idea for some to start by asking about the function of a trait… The 
question is: is it useful for anyone to be a methodological adaptationist rather than 
following an evolutionary factors approach? (Lloyd 2015, 348 fn. 32) 
She answers no because she does not allow that methodological adaptationists can systematically 
entertain the factors included in the evolutionary factors view while imposing an ordering on the 
factors. But without recourse to the lack of stopping rules, this cannot be maintained. I have 
shown how starting points are useful, in part because they enable powerful heuristics for moving 
beyond one’s starting points. Further, the continued existence of adaptationism, competitionism, 
neutralism, and the many other research programs organized around a subset of factors in the 
hostile environments that are their larger disciplines is a good sign that such methodologies are 
useful in general. Specific criticisms are needed to undermine specific programs.  
Division of Labor  
In the last quotation, Lloyd also suggests that starting points are not enough to distinguish 
approaches because they are variations within one methodology engaged in “the division of 
scientific labor”. This response portrays research programs like the competitionists and 
neutralists as engaged as parts of a larger, unified program using the Ecological Factors 
Framework. But these programs do not only mutually benefit each other while working toward 
common goals. They work on only partially overlapping questions and offer competing answers 
to them. Programs in ecology interact in ways analogous to how species interact in a community.  
 
7. Methodological Pluralism 
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Lurking beneath the difference between the LRQ and +OF is a deep philosophical 
question about scientific methodology. The question is, How many acceptable methodological 
approaches are there for a given domain of biology? Methodological monists answer “one”, 
methodological pluralists answer “many”. It is unclear from her writing whether Lloyd is a 
methodological monist in evolution. But one reason for suspecting she might be is that, as I have 
argued in this paper so far, the Evolutionary Factors Framework seems to be the only acceptable 
evolutionary approach. There are multiple approaches, but there can be only one good approach 
with the LRQ because only the EFF approach encompasses all the evolutionary factors.  
Lloyd positions herself as a pluralist against the monistic and dogmatic adaptationists. 
But in her lumping together of what I have argued are acceptable forms of methodological 
adaptationism under the EFF, I see a monistic inclination. My +OF proposal in contrast supports 
methodological pluralism and diversity. This section draws out this monistic consequence of her 
treatment of MA and EFF in evolution by relating it to her previous work on the levels of 
selection in order to better understand her views.  
By recognizing that approaches order factors, we can distinguish methodological 
monism/pluralism from factor monism/pluralism. Lloyd is a factor pluralist because she argues, 
against the factor monism of dogmatic adaptationists, that any good approach must be open to 
considering all relevant factors. But again, she seemingly argues further that there can be only 
one approach in evolution—the EFF—and so for methodological monism.  
Lloyd’s position on factors and approaches mirrors her position on a question about the 
levels of selection, whether natural selection operates at the level of genes (Genic Selection 
View) or at the levels of genes and organisms (Multi-Level Selection View). Lloyd argued that 
once the multi-level selection view is accepted, it would follow that genic models would stop 
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being used (Lloyd 2005). She argued that all processes known to be a causally relevant to a 
pattern should be incorporated into all models used to fit that pattern. Ken Waters responded that 
there are tradeoffs associated with using genic and multi-level selection models and that each 
model is appropriate some of the time (Waters 2005). Therefore, we should not expect genic 
models to go away. Waters characterized his position as “pluralism about levels of selection” and 
Lloyd’s as “monism about the levels of selection”, but the distinction concerns the usefulness of 
one vs. many kinds of model of selection, because both sides acknowledge selection can operate 
at multiple levels.11 I will refer to these positions as model monism and model pluralism, 
respectively.  
The Genic Selection View supports level monism while the Multi-Level Selection View 
supports level pluralism. Lloyd believes that natural selection operates at multiple levels (level 
pluralism) and further argues that the only good models of natural selection are multi-level 
selection models (model monism). This is analogous to how that she believes that all the many 
evolutionary factors beyond natural selection need to be included in any evolutionary approach 
(factor pluralism) and further argues that the only good evolutionary approach is the EFF 
(methodological monism). Just as all levels of selection should be incorporated into all models of 
selection, so too should all factors be included into the one and only approach. I accept factor 
pluralism about biological factors and further advocate methodological pluralism for the same 
reason Waters advocates model pluralism, namely that multiple approaches, each taking a subset 
of factors as their starting point, are good strategies to investigate biological systems.  
 
11 It is worth noting that Lloyd responded that she is also a pluralist and that “Waters seems to 
think that he and his coauthors hold a monopoly on the term ‘pluralism’.” (Lloyd et al. 2005) 
Nevertheless, I agree with Waters that model and methodological pluralisms are the more 
interesting and challenging forms of pluralism.  
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This discussion of pluralism concerns Lloyd’s application of the LRQ to evolution. She 
has also applied the LRQ to a methodological dispute in climate science (Lloyd and Oreskes 
2018). Here she and Naomi Oreskes defend the emergence of the new storyline approach of and 
its continued existence alongside the preexisting risk-based approach. Without going into detail, 
I view this as a successful application of the LRQ to characterize and distinguish methodological 
approaches. And it shows that Lloyd should not be characterized as a methodological monist in 
every domain.  
But this successful application does not mean that the arguments I have made in this 
paper do not stand. First, my +OF proposal is not committed to the consequence that no two 
acceptable methodological approaches in a given domain can be distinguished by questions and 
factors alone. The climate science case seems to be a case where they can be. Second, the climate 
science alternative methodologies are therefore differently different than the methodological 
approaches I have considered here in evolution and ecology. In my view, the relevant difference 
is that the approaches Lloyd and I discuss in evolution and ecology require distinguishing the 
order in which factors are considered. I presume that other approaches in evolution and ecology 
can be characterized, as in climate science, using only the LRQ. But I have argued in this paper 
that methodological adaptationism and its ecological analogs neutralism and competitionism 
cannot be. And third, this climate methodology application corroborates my view that the LRQ is 
capable of and that Lloyd uses to neutrally characterize methodologies in terms of questions and 
factors, not only to criticize problematic applications.   
 
8. Conclusion 
Adaptationism and analogous methodologies consider their preferred factor first. While 
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some dogmatic programs crudely fail to look beyond their starting point, this is not an essential 
feature of all adaptationist approaches. We therefore need to enrich the Logic of Research 
Questions framework needs to characterize methodologies at the scale of adaptationism, 
competitionism, and neutralism. These programs take a methodological starting point that 
enables heuristics like Baseline Modeling and Adding Complexity to give direction to their 
research. We should understand approaches not only in terms of the factors they are open to 
considering but also the order in which they will consider them. The Ordered Factors Proposal 
shows that characterizing research questions remains a useful tool for understanding local 
research activities of research programs in particular contexts. Research programs ask many 
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